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INTELLIGENT DESIGN AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT: A RESPONSE 
JAY D. WEXLER*
Although the struggle over teaching evolution in the public schools has 
never been far from the front pages of the nation’s newspapers ever since 
John Scopes was convicted of teaching the theory in 1925,1 the 
controversy has recently ascended to new heights.2 In late 2004, the school 
board of the Dover School District in Pennsylvania passed a series of 
measures requiring teachers to inform students that evolution is 
incomplete and to make available to students a textbook on “intelligent 
design” (“ID”), a purportedly scientific theory suggesting that an 
intelligent agent created the universe and everything in it, including human 
beings.3 In December 2005, a federal district Judge ruled that the school’s 
policies violated the First Amendment.4 Although the court’s sweeping 
opinion condemning ID will likely make many school districts hesitate 
before implementing similar policies, it is also probably the case that at 
least some districts will remain undeterred. Thus the court’s decision in 
Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School Board is not likely to be the last word on 
the constitutionality of ID.  
In a series of recent writings, including a full length book and several 
articles, Baylor University professor Francis J. Beckwith has argued that 
public schools may constitutionally teach ID.5 In doing so, Beckwith has 
 * Associate Professor, Boston University School of Law. The author thanks Jack Beermann, 
Ward Farnsworth, Bill Marshall, Trevor Morrison, Kate Silbaugh, and participants at a faculty 
workshop at Boston University School of Law for extremely helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
 1. For a short history of the controversy over teaching evolution, see Jay D. Wexler, Note, Of 
Pandas, People, and the First Amendment: The Constitutionality of Teaching Intelligent Design in the 
Public Schools, 49 STAN. L. REV. 439, 444–52 (1997). 
 2. For a selection of recent accounts of the controversy in the mainstream press, see, for 
example, Claudia Wallis, The Evolution Wars, TIME, Aug. 15, 2005, at 28 (discussing, among other 
things, President Bush’s recent support for discussing intelligent design in public school classrooms); 
Editorial, The Evolution of Creationism, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2005, at A20; Lawrence M. Krauss, 
School Boards Want to ‘Teach the Controversy.’ What Controversy?, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2005, at 
F5; H. Allen Orr, Devolution: Why Intelligent Design Isn’t, THE NEW YORKER, May 30, 2005, at 40; 
Peter Slevin, Teachers, Scientists Vow to Fight Challenge to Evolution, WASH. POST, May 5, 2005, at 
A3.  
 3. See John Riley, A Matter of ‘Intelligent Design’: A Pennsylvania School Board Is at the 
Center of a Controversial Approach to Teaching Creation as an Alternative to Evolution, NEWSDAY, 
Jan. 14, 2005, at A10. Practitioners of ID generally do not specify the specific identity of the 
intelligent designer, and they do not describe the designer in Christian, biblical, or other traditional 
religious terms. For more on the theory, see, for example, Wexler, supra note 1, at 441–42. 
 4. See Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005). 
 5. FRANCIS J. BECKWITH, LAW, DARWINISM, AND PUBLIC EDUCATION: THE ESTABLISHMENT 
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considered and critiqued a number of arguments I have previously 
advanced in my own writing,6 calling them “hardly persuasive,”7 “wide of 
the mark,”8 “logically fallacious,”9 “patently unreasonable,”10 and 
“philosophically irrelevant.”11 In this Essay, I respond to Beckwith’s 
arguments regarding ID, both those that specifically critique my own 
arguments, as well as those that stand on their own. I argue that many of 
Beckwith’s arguments in favor of the constitutionality of teaching ID fail 
and that the question of whether public schools may teach the theory 
consistent with the First Amendment is far more difficult than Beckwith 
would appear to believe. 
To be sure, I do not disagree with all of Professor Beckwith’s positions. 
Indeed, we agree on a number of important points. For instance, I agree 
with Beckwith that courts will not get far by trying to demarcate scientific 
CLAUSE AND THE CHALLENGE OF INTELLIGENT DESIGN (2003); Francis J. Beckwith, Intelligent 
Design in the Schools: Is It Constitutional?, 25 CHRISTIAN RES. J. no.4 (2003); Francis J. Beckwith, A 
Liberty Not Fully Evolved?: The Case of Rodney LeVake and the Right of Public School Teachers to 
Criticze Darwinism, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1311 (2002); Francis J. Beckwith, Public Education, 
Religious Establishment, and the Challenge of Intelligent Design, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHICS & 
PUB. POL’Y 461 (2003). 
 6. In addition to the Note cited supra note 1, see also Jay D. Wexler, Darwin, Design, and 
Disestablishment: Teaching the Evolution Controversy in Public Schools, 56 VAND. L. REV. 751 
(2003). I have also recently published a review essay on the evolution controversy and the Scopes Trial 
in the Georgetown Law Journal, although this piece was published after Beckwith’s work on ID 
critical of my position. See Jay D. Wexler, The Scopes Trope, 93 GEO. L.J. 1693 (2005) (reviewing 
LARRY A. WITHAM, WHERE DARWIN MEETS THE BIBLE: CREATIONISTS AND EVOLUTIONISTS IN 
AMERICA (2002). Beckwith and I debated the constitutionality of intelligent design at a Spring 2005 
event sponsored by the Harvard Federalist Society. For one account of that debate, see Nick Mattke, 
Who’s Your Daddy? Intelligent Design Creationism at Harvard Law School (Apr. 20, 2005), 
http://www.pandasthumb.org/pt-archives/000974.html.  
 Beckwith’s book was also the focus of a Harvard Law Review student book note, Book Note, Not 
Your Daddy’s Fundamentalism: Intelligent Design in the Classroom, 117 HARV. L. REV. 964 (2004), 
which started a bit of a controversy in the blogosphere when Brian Leiter attacked the author as 
“perpetrat[ing] (intentionally or otherwise) a scholarly fraud” and argued that the book note is riddled 
with “factual errors and misleading innuendoes” from start to finish. Brian Leiter, Harvard Law 
Review Embarrasses Itself, (Mar. 10, 2004), http://webapp.utexas.edu/blogs/archives/bleiter/000878. 
html. For more on this controversy, see Hunter Baker, The Professor’s Paroxysm: A Scholar’s Attack 
on a Student Writer—and Academic Freedom, National Review Online, (Mar. 15, 2004), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/baker200403150909.asp; Brian Leiter, The Denouement to 
the VanDyke Debate about Intelligent Design Creationism, (Mar. 16, 2004), http://webapp.utexas.edu/ 
blogs/archives/bleiter/000954.html; Posting of Adam White to Ex Parte, http://fedsoc.blogspot.com/ 
2004_03_01_fedsoc_archive.html#107931360182005218 (Mar. 14, 2004, 20:20 EST) (quoting 
Lawrence Van Dyke’s response to Leiter’s critique). 
 7. BECKWITH, supra note 5, at 151. 
 8. Id. at 150. 
 9. Id. at 156. 
 10. Id. at 154. 
 11. Id. at 156. 
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theories from non-scientific ones12 (though I do not think this matters for 
constitutional analysis); that it is bad policy to teach evolution without 
teaching about alternative ways of thinking about origins13 (though I 
would address this problem not by teaching intelligent design in science 
classes but by teaching about religion in stand-alone comparative religion 
classes); and that ID should not be found unconstitutional simply because 
it lends support to Christianity and other monotheistic belief systems14 
(though I think it is constitutionally problematic for other reasons).  
Despite these areas of agreement, I do disagree with Beckwith’s 
ultimate conclusion that teaching ID in the public schools would likely be 
constitutional. In my view, teaching the theory would raise significant 
problems under the First Amendment. More specifically, I disagree with 
Beckwith in three important substantive areas, namely whether courts 
should find that ID constitutes a religious belief, whether the Court’s 
decision in Edwards v. Aguillard15 casts doubt on the constitutionality of 
teaching ID, and whether teachers have any First Amendment academic 
freedom right to teach ID in direct contravention of clear school policy. In 
this three-part Essay I address these issues in turn. 
I. IS INTELLIGENT DESIGN A RELIGION? 
Beckwith argues that ID is not a religion because it is not a 
conventional religion like Christianity or Judaism but rather a “point of 
view based on philosophical and empirical arguments,”16 one that simply 
provides answers to the same question that evolution answers, namely: 
“What is the origin of apparent design in biological organisms and/or other 
aspects of the natural universe?”17 Beckwith also argues that ID is not a 
religion under the prevailing courts of appeals test because ID does not 
address fundamental questions, is not comprehensive in nature, and is not 
accompanied by formal or external signs (like rituals, services, clergy, 
holidays) that are associated with those belief systems generally 
recognized as religious.18 Beckwith’s first point is only partly true but is 
 12. See id. at 23–28; Wexler, supra note 1, at 466–68. 
 13. See BECKWITH, supra note 5, at 120–26. 
 14. See id. at 149. 
 15. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 597 (1987) (holding that Louisiana’s statute requiring 
equal time for the teaching of evolution and creation science violated the Establishment Clause). 
 16. BECKWITH, supra note 5, at 148–49. 
 17. Id. at 150. 
 18. See id. at 152–53. The prevailing circuit court test can be found in the following cases: 
Alvarado v. City of San Jose, 94 F.3d 1223, 1225 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the city of San Jose 
could erect a sculpture of Quettalcoatl, an Aztec god, without violating the Establishment Clause); 
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irrelevant in any event; his second point represents a correct application of 
a nonetheless inappropriate legal test for determining whether ID 
constitutes a religion. ID’s status or non-status as religion requires a 
different type of analysis than the prevailing test provides, and thus 
whether the theory constitutes religion cannot be resolved by application 
of that test. Although the question of whether ID is religion cannot be 
determined by application of any existing precedent, the better view is that 
the theory is religious in nature because it espouses a concept—the world 
was designed by an intelligent creator—that is inherently religious. 
Beckwith is correct, of course, to argue that ID is not a conventional 
religion like Christianity. By its own terms, the theory of ID does not 
incorporate the corpus of any particular religious tradition; it simply 
makes a claim about the origin and design of the universe without 
connecting that claim to any particular system of belief. Although it may 
be the case that most ID supporters are in fact Christians, and although it is 
certainly true that ID theory does lend some support to Christian beliefs, 
neither of these facts is constitutionally relevant.  
Beckwith is also right when he argues that ID does not meet the 
prevailing test in the courts of appeals for determining whether a belief 
system constitutes a religion for First Amendment purposes.19 That test, as 
articulated by the Third and Ninth Circuits, asks whether a belief system is 
comprehensive in nature, addresses fundamental questions, and is 
accompanied by “certain formal and external signs” common to traditional 
religions, such as symbols, rituals, holidays, and clergy members.20 
Beckwith argues that ID fails this test because it lacks these types of signs, 
is an isolated teaching rather than a comprehensive one, and does not 
address “fundamental and ultimate questions having to do with deep and 
imponderable matters.”21 Although one might posit that ID does in fact 
address fundamental questions, and although the existence of “formal and 
external signs” is not a necessary precondition for religion under the 
relevant test,22 Beckwith is on solid ground in claiming that ID fails the 
Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1036 (3d Cir. 1981) (denying a free exercise claim of a 
prisoner who belonged to an organization called MOVE); Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 207–10 (3d 
Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring) (first articulating the test in a case involving transcendental 
meditation training in schools). 
 19. See supra note 18. 
 20. See, e.g., Alvarado, 94 F.3d at 1229; Africa, 662 F.2d at 1032. 
 21. See BECKWITH, supra note 5, at 152. 
 22. See Africa, 662 F.2d at 1032 (noting that “a religion often can be recognized by the presence 
of certain formal and external signs”) (emphasis added). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss1/2
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test because it is an isolated teaching rather than a comprehensive belief 
system. 
As it turns out, however, this conclusion does not save ID from 
constitutional infirmity. The legal test Beckwith relies upon cannot be the 
right test for determining whether ID counts as religion for First 
Amendment purposes. If it were, then schools could encourage students to 
pray, since the concept of prayer, by itself, does not meet the three-part 
test either. Likewise, if Beckwith is right, then schools could teach the 
truth of reincarnation, karma, sin, or other indisputably religious concepts, 
because none of these concepts by itself would meet the three-part test. 
What these obvious examples demonstrate is that a different test must 
apply when the question is whether some concept, practice, or belief in 
isolation is religious, as opposed to whether some broader and more 
integrated belief system constitutes a religious belief as a whole.23
The courts have not explicitly recognized this problem as of yet, but it 
seems to me that the right analysis for the question would ask whether the 
concept, practice, or belief in question sounds in religion rather than in 
some other area of intellectual inquiry, such that government promotion of 
the concept would be understood by a reasonable person as an 
advancement or endorsement of religion. Although I will not spell out here 
in any great detail what exact questions this test would ask, it would seem 
that reasonable inquiries would include such questions as whether a 
reasonable person would associate the concept primarily with religion; 
whether the concept is an important aspect of the religious traditions that 
people generally know about; whether the concept is also prominently 
associated with ideas or belief systems that most people do not view as 
religious; and whether, if the concept is associated with non-religious 
belief systems, it is more prominently associated with those belief systems 
than with religious traditions, or vice versa. 
 23. See Wexler, supra note 6, at 815–17. 
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Although this test may be somewhat circular,24 and although 
application of the test will be difficult at the margins,25 the test is in fact 
quite easy to apply in the case of ID. Does ID sound in religion? Does the 
notion that an intelligent designer created the world and all of its 
inhabitants sound in religion? Sure it does. The intelligent design of the 
universe is the core concept of the major prominent Western religions, 
without which those religious traditions would be unrecognizable. Most 
reasonable people would associate the intelligent design of the universe 
with religion. There is no significant non-religious school of thought that 
has an intelligent designer or creator as a core concept, even if it might be 
the case, as Beckwith suggests, that some have used the term “God” in a 
philosophical sense.26 Finally, to the extent that Supreme Court language 
is relevant to the determination of important constitutional questions 
(which is a great extent indeed), the Court in Edwards specifically 
described the belief that “a supernatural being created humankind” as 
“religious.”27  
In the context of addressing whether ID constitutes religion, Beckwith 
argues that evolution and ID “are not two different subjects (the first 
religion, the second science) but two different answers about the same 
subject.”28 For example, in his full-length book Law, Darwinism, and 
Public Education: The Establishment Clause and the Challenge of 
Intelligent Design, Beckwith responds to my claim that evolution differs 
from ID in that the former “deals only with proximate causes, not ultimate 
ones,” by claiming that my position is “wide of the mark” because: 
 24. This circularity, however, does not distinguish this test from other tests that address the 
question of what counts as “religion” for First Amendment purposes. For example, the three-part Third 
and Ninth Circuit tests discussed above, see supra note 18, by asking whether the belief system in 
question possesses some of the familiar “formal and external signs” of traditional religions, is 
essentially a circular inquiry: the belief system is a religion if it shares some of the characteristics of 
those things we already recognize as religious. Likewise, the scholarly position that this Third Circuit 
test most closely resembles, the so-called “analogical approach” to defining religion supported by Kent 
Greenawalt is also circular in nature. See Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional 
Law, 72 CAL. L. REV. 753, 753 (1984) (“[C]ourts should decide whether something is religious by 
comparison with the indisputably religious, in light of the particular legal problem involved.”) The 
circularity does not undermine the soundness of the approach. Indeed, circularity is a common 
attribute of constitutional tests, and this circularity does not necessarily constitute an inherent problem 
for those tests. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 377 
(2002) (explaining why many “issues of structural constitutionalism end up in a circle” and why this is 
not a problem). 
 25. It hardly needs pointing out that this characteristic does not distinguish the test from other 
constitutional tests.  
 26. BECKWITH, supra note 5, at 164. 
 27. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 591–92 (1987). 
 28. BECKWITH, supra note 5, at 149. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss1/2
p63 Wexler book pages.doc9/11/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
2006] INTELLIGENT DESIGN AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 69 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Naturalistic evolution in fact provides an answer to the very same 
question ID provides an answer: What is the origin of apparent 
design in biological organisms and/or other aspects of the natural 
universe? Evolution answers the question by appealing to the forces 
of unguided matter, the latter to intelligent agency. Same question, 
different answers.29
It is not entirely clear what Beckwith is trying to do with this argument. 
Although it is included in the book’s section on ID’s constitutional status 
as religion, Beckwith ties the argument to his claim that 
forbidding the teaching of ID . . . in public schools because it lends 
support to a religion, while exclusively permitting or requiring the 
teaching of naturalistic evolution unconditionally, might be 
construed by a court as viewpoint discrimination, a violation of state 
neutrality on matters of religion, and/or the institutionalizing of a 
metaphysical orthodoxy.30
To the extent that this is Beckwith’s main claim, it fails both as a 
descriptive matter and a normative one.  
For one thing, schools likely do not forbid the teaching of ID because 
ID “lends support” to a religion, but rather because they believe either that 
it is religion (and thus cannot be promoted in the public schools) or that it 
is bad science, and therefore does not belong in a science classroom. 
Moreover, Beckwith’s suggestion that public schools must be viewpoint 
neutral in what they teach is clearly incorrect. While the government may 
not discriminate against private speakers on the basis of viewpoint in an 
open or limited public forum,31 there is no constitutional requirement that 
the state’s own speech remain neutral.32 If the Constitution did impose 
such a requirement, then schools could not endorse any controversial 
moral or factual viewpoint whatsoever. They could not tell students, for 
example, to stay away from drugs, that gender equality is something worth 
striving for, or that the Holocaust actually occurred, without also 
presenting the arguments to the contrary.  
 29. Id. at 149, 150 (quoting Wexler, supra note 1, at 462 n.212). 
 30. Id. at 149. 
 31. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–30 
(1995). 
 32. Indeed, there is not even a requirement that the government’s funding of private speech (as 
opposed to regulation of that speech) be viewpoint neutral. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 
178 (1991) (upholding regulations prohibiting grant recipients from recommending abortion to 
patients). 
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To the extent that Beckwith is trying to use this “two answers to the 
same question” argument in some way to establish that ID is not religion 
for constitutional purposes, the argument also fails. For one thing, it is far 
from clear that evolutionists would agree that the question they are seeking 
to answer is how to explain the apparent design of the universe and its 
biological organisms. But even if at some level of generality this were the 
question they were addressing, they would be addressing the question in 
such a different fashion than ID theorists that they could hardly be said to 
be asking the same question in any meaningful way. For evolutionists the 
question would be something like: “What is the best naturalistic 
explanation that we can study and test and measure using the scientific 
method for the universe’s apparent design?” whereas the ID theorists are 
asking a much different question, namely: “What is the best explanation 
for the apparent design, period?” ID theorists answer this question by 
pointing to a supernatural intelligent designer, but evolutionists claim that 
such an answer is out of bounds with respect to their question because it is 
impossible, at least at this point in human development, to say anything 
helpful or meaningful at all within the confines of the scientific method 
about such a designer.33  
Beckwith claims that by responding to the claims of ID theorists in this 
way, evolutionists are committing themselves to so-called philosophical 
naturalism, an ontological world-view which inherently rejects the 
existence of supernatural phenomena.34 This is simply not true. The fact 
that scientists apply the scientific method in their work reflects only a 
recognition that historically this method has produced tremendously 
successful results, in terms of explanation and prediction of natural 
phenomena (much better, for example, then looking to supernatural 
explanations, intuition, random number drawing, etc.), rather than any a 
priori metaphysical commitment to naturalism.35 Indeed, many scientists, 
 33. See, e.g., Eugenie Scott, Scott Replies to Dembski, (Feb. 1, 2001), http://www.ncseweb.org/ 
resources/articles/3598_scott_replies_to_dembski_2_2_2001.asp (“One cannot use natural processes 
to hold constant the actions of supernatural forces; hence it is impossible to test (by naturalistic 
methodology) supernatural explanations. Whether a supernatural force does or does not act is thus 
outside of what science can tell us.”) (citation omitted). 
 34. See BECKWITH, supra note 5, at 6–7, 92–95. 
 35. See, e.g., Brian Leiter, The Denouement to the VanDyke Debate about Intelligent Design 
Creationism, (Mar. 16, 2004) http://webapp.utexas.edu/blogs/archives/bleiter/000954.html. Leiter 
writes: 
The difficulty [with calling science’s naturalistic methodology “a priori”] . . . is that science 
did not “a priori pick a naturalistic methodology”; it adopted, based on evidence and 
experience (i.e., a posteriori), the methods that worked: it turns out that if you make 
predictions, test the predictions against experience, refine the hypotheses on which the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss1/2
p63 Wexler book pages.doc9/11/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
2006] INTELLIGENT DESIGN AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 71 
 
 
 
 
 
 
who use the scientific method regularly as part of their day-to-day work, 
are theists, which suggests that a commitment to methodological 
naturalism (the commitment to using the scientific method to explain and 
predict natural phenomena) does not in fact entail or imply a commitment 
to philosophical naturalism.36 My original claim, then, that evolutionists 
and intelligent design theorists are in fact asking very different questions, 
is hardly “wide of the mark.”37 Instead, it is Beckwith’s critique that 
misses the target. 
In any event, the most important point is that whether the two camps 
are asking different questions is simply irrelevant to resolving the 
constitutional question of whether ID counts as religion. The nature of an 
answer—in other words, whether that answer is “religious” or “scientific” 
or “political” or “literary” or whatever—turns on the content of the 
answer, not the question that it is answering. Different fields of study seek 
to explain the same phenomena all the time, but this does not mean that 
their answers should be lumped together under the same label.  
To take one small example from the legal field, political scientists and 
legal academics approach the question of why the Supreme Court decides 
cases the way it does in very different ways. Legal academics tend to look 
at the specific nature of the legal question presented and the strength of the 
competing legal arguments, whereas political scientists tend to place far 
more emphasis on the ideological commitments of the Justices and which 
political party has been primarily responsible for the appointment of the 
particular Justices serving on the Court.38 The two fields employ very 
different assumptions and methodologies, and they come to very different 
conclusions. The fact that they happen to be addressing the same question 
does not justify grouping their answers together as representing the same 
field of inquiry. To take another example from the realm of religion, 
imagine a person wondering whether to eat a lobster. The person asks both 
a dietitian and an Orthodox Jewish rabbi what to do. The dietitian tells the 
person to eat the lobster because it is high in protein and low in fat;39 the 
predictions are based, test them again, and so on, you figure out how to predict and control 
the world around you. 
See also Matthew Brauer et al., Is It Science Yet?: Intelligent Design Creationism and the 
Constitution, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (2005). 
 36. See Brauer et al., supra note 35, at 46–58. 
 37. See supra note 5, at 150.
 38. For a comparison of the two approaches to Supreme Court decision-making, see Theodore 
W. Ruger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science Approaches to 
Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150, 1152–60 (2004). 
 39. This is true. See Nutrition Facts and Analysis for Crustaceans, http://www.nutritiondata.com/ 
facts-001-02s037v.html (noting that, despite having 104 milligrams of cholesterol, one cup of cooked 
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rabbi tells the person not to eat the lobster because it is not kosher. The 
two advisors have answered the same question, but is there any doubt that 
the rabbi’s answer is religious and the dietitian’s is not?40
Thus, even if evolutionists and ID theorists were asking the same 
question, it would not mean that their answers should be categorized the 
same way. When the evolutionist answers the question of “what is the 
origin of apparent design in biological organisms and/or other aspects of 
the natural universe” (assuming, again, that this is what the evolutionist is 
asking), by responding “the apparent design of biological organisms can 
be explained by evolution through natural selection,” the answer does not 
sound in religion. When the ID theorist, on the other hand, responds by 
saying “we can explain this apparent design by reference to an intelligent 
creator who created the universe and everything in it,” that answer sounds 
in religion.41 The two answers are fundamentally different in kind and 
category, even if we assume that the two questions are the same. The 
Establishment Clause simply prohibits the government from teaching the 
religious answer (but not the non-religious answer) as truth. 
All this wrangling over whether ID constitutes “religion” may, 
however, be beside the point. After all, although public schools cannot 
promote or advance or endorse or teach the truth of any religion, they are 
perfectly free to teach about religion as much as they want.42 They can 
teach about Christianity, about Judaism, about Zoroastrianism, and about 
Raelianism.43 Not only can they teach about religion, but they should 
teach about religion, and they do not teach about religion nearly enough.44 
So, if public schools can teach about religion, why shouldn’t they be able 
to teach about ID? To some degree they certainly can. For example, if a 
public school chose to teach about the ID movement in a current affairs 
class, or about the philosophical claims of ID in a philosophy of science 
class, or about the truth claims of ID in a comparative religion class, most 
northern lobster has thirty grams of protein and one gram of total fat). 
 40. The dietitian’s answer—to the effect it might cause a religious believer on the fence to eat the 
lobster because of its healthy qualities—may have the effect of influencing the believer’s religious 
practice, but this doesn’t make the answer religious any more than, for example, a government policy 
outlawing all uses of peyote, including religious uses.  
 41. See supra notes 23–27 and accompanying text. 
 42. For an extended consideration of the constitutional issues involved in teaching about religion, 
see Jay D. Wexler, Preparing for the Clothed Public Square: Teaching About Religion, Civic 
Education, and the Constitution, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159, 1243–62 (2002). 
 43. Raelianism is a relatively new religious movement that believes aliens created the human 
race over 25,000 years ago. See Christian Apologetics & Research Ministry, The Raelians, 
http://www.carm.org/raelians.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2005). 
 44. For an extended argument that schools should teach about religion, see Wexler, supra note 
42, at 1200–20. 
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likely these choices would pose no constitutional problem, so long as the 
school taught about ID in a fully objective manner and in good faith.  
Things are very different, however, when schools propose to teach ID 
in a science classroom as an alternative scientific theory to evolution. As I 
have discussed elsewhere, the fact that science teachers generally do not 
teach science objectively but rather present the best thinking in the field as 
the current state of knowledge poses the significant risk that even well-
intentioned teachers may end up leaving students with the impression that 
ID is in fact true.45 This problem is exacerbated by the lack of adequate 
materials for teachers to use to teach evolution and ID together in an 
objective fashion.46 Most important, however, even a policy that urges 
schools to use an objective approach to teaching about ID might constitute 
an unconstitutional endorsement of religion, such that the very adoption of 
the policy would be unconstitutional, even if teachers were able to teach 
successfully about ID in an objective manner. Whether this would be the 
case turns in large part on the proper understanding of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Edwards, to which the Essay now turns. 
II. WHAT ABOUT EDWARDS? 
Professor Beckwith and I agree that the Supreme Court’s 1987 decision 
in Edwards v. Aguillard47 is the most important existing precedent for 
evaluating the constitutionality of teaching ID in public schools, but we 
disagree on which way the case points.48 In Edwards, the Court struck 
down Louisiana’s attempt to require its schools to teach both creation 
 45. See Wexler, supra note 6, at 821. 
 46. See id. at 822. 
 47. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987). 
 48. As I have explained elsewhere, I think that the Edwards case is relevant to understanding not 
only how the Court might review an ID policy’s purpose, but also how it would review the claim that 
an ID policy endorsed religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. See Wexler, supra notes 1, 6. 
The Court in Edwards considered the former and not the latter, but it seems that the same factors that 
led it to conclude that the legislature there had no secular purpose would also have led it to conclude 
that the statute endorsed religion. See Wexler, supra note 6, at 827. Thus, I analyze the same factors 
for both possible constitutional objections. My personal belief is that the endorsement analysis is 
superior to the religious purpose analysis in a case in which the legislature articulates a secular 
purpose. 
 Of course, the Court’s recent decision in Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005), particularly 
Justice Breyer’s controlling concurrence in that case, in which he writes that there is “no test-related 
substitute for the exercise of legal judgment,” id. at 2869 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment), casts 
some doubt on the state of the law in the area of government sponsorship or endorsement of religion. 
Without further elucidation from the Court or Justice Breyer, however, I would suggest that the same 
analysis provided in this Essay would apply to the sort of “know it when I see it” approach of Justice 
Breyer as well as to a purpose or endorsement approach. 
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science and evolution whenever they taught one of those subjects.49 The 
Court found that the statute was animated by an improper religious 
purpose.50 In my view, the Court emphasized four problems with the 
Louisiana creation science equal time statute which are relevant to 
addressing the constitutionality of any ID policy: (1) the poor fit between 
the means of the statute and its ends (the goal of promoting academic 
freedom);51 (2) the historic link between religion and critiques of 
evolution;52 (3) the singling out of evolution from among all possible 
topics of reform;53 and (4) statements from the legislative history 
indicating an intent to promote religion.54 All of these factors are present 
in the ID controversy.55 Stated in a very strong form, the constitutional 
case against ID can be phrased in terms of these four factors as follows: 
Against a long visible historic background of obviously religious 
opposition to the teaching of evolution, once again another movement 
arrives that often speaks in very religious terms and singles out evolution 
from among all topics in the school curriculum for change, in order to 
achieve the purported goal of informing students about a significant 
scientific controversy when in fact no such controversy exists. What 
message does a school send to the reasonable observer if it embraces such 
a movement? It seems likely that the received message would be that the 
government is reforming the curriculum for religious reasons, which is 
exactly what the Court in Edwards said the government cannot do.56
For Beckwith, Edwards supports the constitutionality of teaching ID 
because (1) ID is historically and textually distinguishable from Genesis’s 
accounts of creation as well as the creation science involved in Edwards; 
and (2) the Supreme Court in Edwards recognized that teaching scientific 
alternatives to evolution for some secular purpose might be legitimate.57 I 
disagree that either of these arguments help the legal case for teaching ID.  
 49. Id. at 582. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 587–88. 
 52. Id. at 590–91. 
 53. Id. at 593. 
 54. Id. at 591–93. 
 55. See Wexler, supra note 1, at 826–27. 
 56. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 593 (1987). 
 57. BECKWITH, supra note 5, at 154–64. 
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A. Historic Taint 
On the first of these arguments, Beckwith contends that “ID’s 
intellectual pedigree is of a different order than the creation science the 
Court repudiated in Edwards.”58 He notes that “ID is neither historically 
connected to Scopes nor is its literature . . . transparently directly derived 
from the Book of Genesis.”59 Furthermore, he describes as “patently 
unreasonable”60 my purported claim “that because ID has some historical 
connection to the creation/evolution controversy, it would not pass the 
Edwards standard,”61 and accuses me of making “the genetic fallacy a 
principle of constitutional jurisprudence.”62
To clarify, my position has never been that schools are barred from 
teaching any subject or theory that bears some historical connection to 
religion.63 Indeed, I have argued at length that schools can and should 
teach about religion,64 an argument that would make no sense if I really 
wanted to make the genetic fallacy a principle of First Amendment Law, 
for what could be more closely related to religion than religion itself? Far 
from arguing that teaching ID is unconstitutional simply because it has 
some historical connection to the long-standing controversy over 
evolution, my argument rather is that under the Supreme Court’s 
endorsement test,65 singling out evolution from all the topics in the school 
curriculum for reform by teaching students a purportedly scientific critique 
of evolution that has no support within the scientific community will likely 
be understood by a reasonable observer as continuing the long tradition of 
trying to reform the school curriculum to promote a religious belief.  
 58. Id. at 154. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. According to Beckwith, “[t]he genetic fallacy occurs when the origin of a viewpoint or 
argument, rather than its merits, is employed to dismiss it out of hand.” Id. at 171 n.67. I believe that it 
is quite clear that I did not dismiss any argument “out of hand” but rather dismissed it on the basis of 
sound analysis.  
 63. See, e.g., Wexler, supra note 1, at 464–65 (arguing that a particular iteration of intelligent 
design would fail the endorsement test for a variety of reasons, including historic similarities to past 
practices). 
 64. See generally Wexler, supra note 42. 
 65. See County of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 
573, 597 (1989) (adopting the endorsement test first articulated by Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in 
Lynch); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). The Court recently 
reiterated the endorsement standard in striking down displays of the Ten Commandments in the 
courthouses of two Kentucky counties. See McCreary County, Kentucky v. Am. Civil Liberties Union 
of Kentucky, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2738–41; id. at 2747 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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Beckwith is correct that ID is somewhat different from creation science 
and its previous iterations. ID is based on purportedly scientific theories 
and explanations for observed data, such as William Dembski’s notion of 
an explanatory filter to detect the existence of design in natural systems66 
and Michael Behe’s theory of irreducible complexity that claims certain 
biological systems are too complex to have come into existence through 
evolutionary processes alone.67 Of course, both Dembski’s and Behe’s 
arguments have been widely critiqued,68 but this does not mean that ID 
theory is the exact same system of thought as the creation science put 
forward in Edwards. By itself, however, this means little. There may be 
some areas of law in which a party may be able to make small adjustments 
to its practices to fall outside the letter of a legal prohibition, but 
constitutional law, and certainly First Amendment law, is not one of them. 
For better or for worse, the Court has created an Establishment Clause 
doctrine that requires courts to use common sense to figure out what 
message the government sends through its actions.69 This, in turn, requires 
courts to seek to understand, with some sensitivity, the entire context of 
the challenged practice.70 As the Supreme Court has made clear, one of 
the most important elements of this context is the practice’s historical 
background,71 which in the case of ID, means the entire history of 
religious opposition to evolution. 
The fact that the ID movement is different in some senses from the 
iterations that came before it does not demonstrate that it is not in 
important senses the same: it has very close religious cognates;72 it singles 
 66. See WILLIAM A. DEMBSKI, THE DESIGN INFERENCE: ELIMINATING CHANCE THROUGH 
SMALL PROBABILITIES (1998). 
 67. See MICHAEL J. BEHE, DARWIN’S BLACK BOX: THE BIOCHEMICAL CHALLENGE TO 
EVOLUTION (1996). 
 68. On Behe, see, for example, Kenneth R. Miller, Review of Darwin’s Black Box, 16 
CREATION/EVOLUTION 36 (1996) (book review), available at http://biomed.brown.edu/Faculty/M/ 
Miller/Behe.html; H. Allen Orr, Darwin v. Intelligent Design (Again), BOSTON REV., Dec. 1996/Jan. 
1997, See generally Behe’s Empty Box (Nov. 28, 2001), http://www.simonyi.ox.ac.uk/dawkins/ 
WorldOfDawkins-archive/Catalano/box/behe.shtml#reviews (collecting reviews). On Dembski, for 
example, Branden Fitelson, et al., How Not to Detect Design—Critical Notice: William A. Dembski, 
The Design Inference, 66 PHIL. SCI. 472 (1999); Massimo Pigliucci, Chance, Necessity, and the War 
Against Science, 50 BIOSCIENCE 79 (2000) (book review). 
 69. Of course, the Court’s endorsement test has been widely criticized by scholars. See, e.g., 
Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 117–34 (1992); 
Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the “No 
Endorsement” Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 269 (1987). 
 70. See County of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 
573, 595–97 (1989). 
 71. See id. at 629–31 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 72. See WILLIAM PALEY, NATURAL THEOLOGY (Sheldon & Co. 1875) (1845). (Paley’s 19th 
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out evolution from among all topics in the curriculum; it contends that 
evolution is too materialistic and naturalistic; it uses the same kind of 
language and discourse to attack evolution as previous religious attempts 
to discredit evolution;73 its audience is overwhelmingly constituted by 
adherents of traditional religions;74 it argues that a supernatural entity 
created all of mankind, which is what Edwards said was so problematic 
about creation science;75 and its leaders and implementers are generally 
very religious and often speak in explicitly religious terms.76 Putting all of 
these factors together, the reasonable observer viewing the introduction of 
ID into the public school curriculum would likely identify ID with a 
specific religious project. 
To return to Beckwith’s criticism of my position, then, might it be the 
case that, at least as a practical matter, my approach to ID would make it 
impossible for those who seek to reform the public school curriculum’s 
presentation of science and religion to make any significant impact on that 
curriculum? Have I placed an insurmountable barrier in front of those who 
oppose evolution and support religious views on origins? Will reforms 
invariably be tainted by their historical associations? I do not think so. It is 
true that because of the long and very visible history of religious 
opposition to evolution, opponents of the way our public schools teach 
science and religion will have to make special efforts to disassociate 
themselves from what has gone before in order to defuse the message that 
they are sending with their reforms. For one thing, if any reform is to pass 
constitutional muster, it will probably have to go beyond singling out 
evolution to address a broader subsection of the curriculum. But this does 
not mean that reform is impossible. For example, schools would most 
likely fall within constitutional limits if they taught a wide variety of 
century argument). 
 73. See Wexler, supra note 1, at 464–65 (arguing that the ID textbook, Of Pandas and People, 
uses the same anti-evolution arguments as previous anti-evolution iterations). 
 74. See, e.g., Memorandum from Rebecca Wittman to Mark Edwards (Sept. 21, 2001), 
www.discovery.org/articleFiles/PDFs/ZogbyFinalReport.pdf (reporting that overwhelming majority of 
Protestants questioned believe in intelligent design and the teaching of intelligent design); Zogby Int’l 
Poll May 8, 2002, www.nmidnet.org/OhioZogbyPoll.pdf (reporting that 80% of those Ohioans 
questioned who strongly agree with the notion that students should learn about scientific evidence in 
favor of intelligent design are Catholic or Protestant); The Christian Post, Survey: Protestants Back 
Intelligent Design, (May 26, 2005), http://www.christianpost.com/article/education/822/full/survey. 
protestants.back.intelligent.design/1.htm (poll reports that among doctors most proponents of 
intelligent design are Protestant). 
 75. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 US 578, 591–92 (1987). 
 76. For an account of the religious views and discourse of ID supporters, see, for example, 
BARBARA FORREST & PAUL GROSS, CREATIONISM’S TROJAN HORSE: THE WEDGE OF INTELLIGENT 
DESIGN 15–33 (2004). 
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minority views in science as a way of teaching students how the scientific 
process works, taught about religion and religious views on origins 
(including creation stories from different cultures and traditions, in 
addition to the Biblical ones) in history or comparative religion classes, or 
taught about the evolution controversy in history or current affairs classes. 
B. Secular Purposes 
Beckwith’s second argument regarding Edwards is that the case 
establishes that public schools can teach ID so long as they do so to further 
some secular purpose.77 This argument, too, does not win Beckwith the 
day. Two preliminary points are worth making before exploring the four 
specific secular purposes that Beckwith proposes could animate an ID 
policy. First, of course, although a secular purpose is a necessary condition 
for a policy’s constitutionality, it is not a sufficient one. A statute or 
regulation or any other form of government action may be 
unconstitutional, even though it is animated by a secular purpose, if it 
advances or promotes or endorses religion.78 Indeed, in most cases in 
which the Court has invalidated government activity under the 
Establishment Clause, it has done so even after finding the activity 
supported by some secular purpose.79  
Second, Edwards clearly demonstrates that, at least in the area of 
teaching evolution in the public schools, the Court will not accept 
uncritically the government’s recitation of a secular purpose. Instead, the 
Court (and lower courts faithfully following Supreme Court precedent) 
will examine the actual relationship between the means of the policy and 
the purported secular goal of the policy to test whether that purported 
secular goal is in fact the real purpose underlying the policy. If the 
relationship between the means and ends is too attenuated, the Court will 
not hesitate to find the policy unconstitutional.80
Beckwith argues that a government body could adopt an ID policy for 
one of four possible secular purposes: (1) to introduce students to an 
 77. See BECKWITH, supra note 5, at 156. 
 78. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 649 (2002) (proceeding to analyze 
effects of voucher program after concluding that the program was enacted to serve a secular purpose). 
 79. See Robert A. Sedler, The Settled Nature of American Constitutional Law, 48 WAYNE L. 
REV. 173, 329 (2002) (“While a few cases have been decided under the religious purpose element, the 
overwhelming number of Establishment Clause cases coming before the Court have been decided 
under the religious effect element . . . .”). 
 80. See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 586–90. This could be either because the Court finds that the 
legislative purpose is in fact religious, or because it finds that the policy endorses religion. 
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important new body of scholarship;81 (2) to “enhance and protect the 
academic freedom of teachers and students” who support ID or disagree 
with evolution;82 (3) to erase the perception that the curriculum favors, or 
endorses, an irreligious point of view;83 and (4) to maintain neutrality 
between religious belief and non-belief.84 The following discussion treats 
these four purposes in turn, grouping the latter two together because of 
their similarity. In each case, the discussion addresses both whether courts 
should view these purposes as sincere and whether a policy adopted 
pursuant to such a purported secular purpose would likely advance or 
endorse religion in violation of the Establishment Clause, despite that 
purpose. 
1. Introducing Students to Important Scholarship 
Beckwith first argues that schools could defend an ID policy on the 
basis that they are introducing students to an important body of 
scholarship. Citing the Court’s statement in Edwards that “teaching a 
variety of scientific theories about the origins of humankind to 
schoolchildren might be validly done with the clear secular intent of 
enhancing the effectiveness of science instruction,”85 Beckwith argues that 
a “state could appeal to the importance of exposing students to reputable 
scholarship that critiques the methodological naturalism behind 
naturalistic evolution and the ontological materialism entailed by it.”86 
The notion that schools can teach students ID to introduce them to a new 
and important body of scholarship suffers, however, from the same flaw 
that the creation science statute in Edwards itself suffered—namely a 
significant gap between the means and ends of the policy. Because there is 
no significant scientific disagreement about the basic soundness of 
evolution and the weakness of ID as a scientific theory,87 courts reviewing 
an ID policy justified on the grounds that the policy is intended to 
introduce students to an important body of scholarship may very well be 
correct to find that the purpose is in fact a sham or that the policy endorses 
religion despite the articulated purpose. 
 81. See BECKWITH, supra note 5, at 160. I have changed the order of the four secular purposes to 
facilitate my discussion. His order puts numbers 3–4 before numbers 1–2. 
 82. Id.  
 83. Id. at 156. 
 84. Id. at 157–60. 
 85. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 594 (1987). 
 86. BECKWITH, supra note 5, at 160. 
 87. See infra text accompanying notes 88–92. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p63 Wexler book pages.doc9/11/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
80 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:63 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unlike evolutionary theory, which the scientific community widely 
supports and believes to be one of the most important, central, and robust 
theories in all of biology (if not all of science),88 ID theory has been 
roundly rejected by mainstream scientists.89 Although scientist Michael 
Behe’s foundational ID book, Darwin’s Black Box, has been sporadically 
cited in the scientific literature, for the most part ID theory has been 
completely absent from the peer reviewed literature.90 For example, one 
very recent study showed that only seventeen articles cited any ID terms in 
an ID-specific sense, and some of those citations came in the context of 
criticism of those concepts.91 As Professors Brauer, Forrest, and Gey have 
persuasively demonstrated, the status of ID theory in the scientific 
literature pales in comparison even to the widely rejected theory that the 
HIV virus does not in fact cause AIDS.92
In his defense of ID’s importance, Beckwith notes that the theory has 
been the subject of much popular and journalistic writing and even 
academic reviews, responses, symposia, and conferences.93 This is hardly 
surprising, however, given that ID is undoubtedly an important social, 
cultural, political, and even religious phenomenon, but it is also entirely 
irrelevant to the idea’s status as a scientific theory. Journalists write about 
ID, and academics discuss and respond to the claims of ID not because ID 
has attained any success within the scientific community but because it has 
gained hold among religious conservatives and politicians and thus has 
helped reshape the cultural and educational landscape in important ways. 
Indeed, it may even be accurate to describe some of ID’s success in the 
popular literature as owing much to ID’s scientific shortcomings rather 
than its strengths; one aspect of ID that might have attracted journalistic 
attention is the success the theory has attained among politicians and the 
public despite its failure among scientists. 
Beckwith intriguingly argues that the Supreme Court’s 1993 decision 
in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.94 suggests that success 
in the peer review process should not be considered highly relevant in 
assessing a theory’s scientific merits.95 In that case, the Court held that 
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence did not limit scientific expert 
 88. For a collection of citations on this point, see Wexler, supra note 6, at 804–05 nn.234–35. 
 89. See id. at 805–07 n.236. 
 90. See id. at 807 n.237. 
 91. See Brauer et al., supra note 35, at 81. 
 92. See id. at 79–80. 
 93. See BECKWITH, supra note 5, at xiii–xvii. 
 94. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 95. See BECKWITH, supra note 5, at 23. 
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testimony to those theories that have become generally accepted in the 
scientific community,96 as the then Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia had previously held in a 1923 case, Frye v. United States,97 
which predated the adoption of the Federal Rules. Because the Court noted 
in Daubert that peer review acceptance “is not a sine qua non of 
admissibility” and “does not necessarily correlate with reliability,”98 
Beckwith concludes that the test of ID’s scientific legitimacy should turn 
on “arguments and their soundness” and not their “popularity.”99
Unfortunately for Beckwith, Daubert provides no support for ID’s 
constitutionality. For one thing, the Court did recognize the importance of 
peer review, when it wrote that “submission to the scrutiny of the 
scientific community is a component of ‘good science,’ in part because it 
increases the likelihood that substantive flaws in methodology will be 
detected.”100 And indeed, courts do look to peer review as an important 
factor in their Daubert analysis.101 Moreover, to the degree that ID is 
animated by a rejection of methodological naturalism, or the scientific 
method, Daubert undermined the scientific legitimacy of ID when it 
explained that the “scientific knowledge” standard of Rule 702 
“establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability” and that “to qualify as 
‘scientific knowledge,’ an inference or assertion must be derived by the 
scientific method.”102  
More importantly, because Daubert concerns a fundamentally different 
issue than whether public schools can constitutionally teach ID, it 
actually—when understood correctly—hurts the case for ID’s 
constitutionality. In Daubert, the Court held that Rule 702 allows the 
introduction of some expert scientific testimony into federal court even 
though the proffered science is not “generally accepted.”103 In reaching 
this conclusion, the Court engaged in a run-of-the-mill statutory 
interpretation exercise, and it found that Congress, through its enactment 
of Rule 702, had intended to broaden the range of evidence allowed into 
 96. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589. 
 97. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 98. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. 
 99. BECKWITH, supra note 5, at 23. 
 100. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. 
 101. See, e.g., Joëlle Anne Moreno, Eyes Wide Shut: Hidden Problems and Future Consequences 
of the Fact-Based Validity Standard, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 89, 99 (2003) (noting that the “mere fact 
of peer review, publication, or peer-reviewed publication [has] serv[ed] as a validity enhancer” for 
courts employing a Daubert analysis). 
 102. Id. at 590. 
 103. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589. 
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federal courts substantially beyond that which previously was allowed.104 
Because Congress had intended to allow this broad range of evidence into 
the federal courts, the Court concluded that even evidence which had not 
been subject to extensive peer review could be admitted into court.105 
Thus, if Daubert stands for any general principle regarding the 
prerequisite of peer review, it stands for the notion that if there is a general 
rule which seeks to allow a very broad range of evidence into a forum, 
then peer review need not be required as a prerequisite for admission.  
Public school classrooms, however, are entirely different from federal 
courtrooms. In public schools, the general standard of admissibility for the 
discussion of scientific theories in science classes is far stricter than Rule 
702.106 Schools generally teach only the best, most-settled scientific 
theories—those that have gained the greatest foothold in the profession 
and are the most robust and persuasive theories in their field—rather than 
teaching any theory that can lay any claim at all to plausibility.107 Public 
school science classrooms are thus governed not by a liberal admission 
rule like Rule 702 but by a rule, customary though it may be, that is even 
stricter than the Frye rule that preceded Rule 702. Thus, Daubert is 
completely inapplicable to the ID context and indeed can be read to 
undermine the case for ID’s constitutionality to the extent that it suggests 
non-peer reviewed theories should only be allowed into a forum if some 
governing authority specifically provides for extremely broad admission 
of evidence.  
Because the authority in the public school context is of course set by 
custom or school policy (whether formal or informal) and can thus be 
altered by the school itself, one could read Daubert as lending some 
support to a school that wanted to broaden what types of theories it teaches 
students generally. For example, if a school decided that it would no 
longer restrict itself to teaching the most successful scientific theories but 
would also begin discussing as possibly true a variety of minority or fringe 
theories, it could plausibly point to the Supreme Court’s language in 
Daubert as support. It could, for instance, as a rhetorical matter, say to 
parents and the community that “the Supreme Court has allowed fringe 
theories into the federal courts, why shouldn’t we be able to allow fringe 
 104. See id. at 589 (“Given the Rules’ permissive backdrop and their inclusion of a specific rule 
on expert testimony that does not mention ‘general acceptance,’ the assertion that the Rules somehow 
assimilated Frye is unconvincing.”). 
 105. See id. at 593. 
 106. That the standard is more than likely set by custom, rather than rule, does not make it less 
important for these purposes. 
 107. See Wexler, supra note 6, at 821. 
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theories into the classrooms?”108 But that, of course, is not what the ID 
proponents want to do. They do not suggest that schools change their 
approach to teaching science generally; rather, they argue that schools 
should make an exception to their general strict admission rules in the one 
isolated instance of ID. If a school generally operates under the principle 
that it will only teach students about the best scientific theories—those 
ones that have fared the best under the rigorous peer review process that is 
at the heart of the scientific professions—and it then makes a single 
exception to allow its teachers to teach about one theory that has been 
entirely unsuccessful under that process, then reasonable observers would 
likely understand that the school has decided to teach that one theory for 
some reason other than to teach students about a new and important body 
of scientific scholarship. 
2. Protecting Academic Freedom 
Second, pointing to a number of instances in which ID supporters were 
met with “marginalization, hostility, and public ridicule because of their 
support of ID and/or doubts about [evolution],”109 Beckwith argues that 
schools could defend an ID policy on the basis that they are protecting the 
academic freedom of their teachers and students. Beckwith suggests that 
public school teachers in fact possess a First Amendment right to exercise 
their academic freedom by introducing ID110 and that a policy recognizing 
this right would “simply be affirming by statute or written policy what is 
already a fixed point in constitutional law.”111 In fact, public school 
teachers possess no such constitutional right, as will be discussed 
below.112 Nonetheless, even in the absence of such a right, one could 
perhaps imagine a school wanting to enact an ID policy for the purpose of 
promoting the academic freedom interests of its teachers.  
This argument, however, is unpersuasive, although the precise reason 
for its lack of persuasiveness differs depending on what policy the school 
already takes toward allowing teachers to introduce materials of their own 
 108. To be consistent with federal court practice, the school would have to add the very important 
caveat that it would also teach students about how mainstream science has critiqued the relevant fringe 
theory. One of the basic premises of federal evidence law is that anything introduced into a courtroom 
can be tested and subjected to critique by the other party. This could be a problem for ID, to the extent 
that a school allows the teaching of ID but does not require that students be made aware of ID’s failure 
to succeed in the scientific community and of the numerous critiques of ID theory as terrible science. 
 109. BECKWITH, supra note 5, at 160–63. 
 110. See id. at 73–76. 
 111. Id. at 163. 
 112. See infra text accompanying notes 136–55. 
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choosing into the classroom. If the school already places no limits on what 
the teacher can introduce as a general matter, then a policy that 
specifically allows the teaching of ID cannot plausibly be said to be 
promoting the academic freedom of teachers, since they already possess 
that freedom as a matter of underlying policy. This is precisely what 
happened in Edwards, where the Court held that the Louisiana statute 
could not possibly have furthered the state’s purported interest in 
promoting academic freedom since nothing prevented the teachers from 
exercising that freedom in the first place.113
On the other hand, if the underlying school policy restricts teachers 
from teaching material that is not specifically included in the curriculum, 
then Beckwith’s rationale makes somewhat more sense in that at least the 
school would be allowing teachers to teach something they would 
otherwise not be able to teach. However, like Beckwith’s first argument, 
this one too suffers from a substantial disconnect between means and ends. 
If the true interest of the state or school board or school was really to 
promote the academic freedom of teachers who want to introduce 
controversial topics into the classroom, why would it implement a policy 
that provides an exception to the general “no teaching material not 
specifically included in the curriculum” rule only in the context of 
teaching about alternatives to evolution and not in the myriad other 
contexts in which it might be appropriate?  
The only plausible reason to adopt such a limited policy would be 
either that ID supporters suffer disproportionately more (or more severe) 
hostility than holders of other unpopular beliefs or that hostility over ID is 
more troubling than the same type and amount of hostility toward other 
unpopular beliefs. The latter seems constitutionally problematic in that it 
would represent a judgment by the public school that ID is normatively 
more worthy than other beliefs, and the former seems implausible. Polls 
consistently show that the great majority of Americans believe that an 
intelligent designer exists and that more than half reject evolution and 
believe God created human beings in essentially their current form.114 
 113. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 US 578, 587 (1987). The Court stated, 
The Act does not grant teachers a flexibility that they did not already possess to supplant the 
present science curriculum with the presentation of theories, besides evolution, about the 
origin of life. Indeed, the Court of Appeals found that no law prohibited Louisiana public 
school teachers from teaching any scientific theory. 
Moreover, for similar reasons, ID policies cannot be justified on grounds that they further the 
academic freedom of students, as presumably no government policy exists that would prohibit students 
from learning about ID on their own if they so choose. 
 114. See, e.g., CBS News, Poll: Creationism Trumps Evolution (Nov. 22, 2004), http://www. 
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Surely there are beliefs held by substantially less than half of the 
population that would also require protection by a state that is truly 
interested in protecting the interests of teachers to introduce unpopular 
subjects and perspectives. What about the teacher who wants to discuss in 
class his belief that there is no God, that using drugs is mind-expanding, 
that having sex with many partners is particularly fun, that the Holocaust 
never occurred, or that gender inequality is justified? If the school really 
wants to protect the academic freedom interests of teachers who hold 
unpopular beliefs, would it not protect at least some of these teachers as 
well as the one that wants to discuss ID theory?115  
Of course, there is no general legal requirement that government actors 
attempt to solve problems comprehensively as opposed to 
incrementally.116 That is, as a general matter, nothing would prohibit a 
school from promoting the academic freedom of its teachers in one area 
but not others, even if it would make sense for the school to promote 
academic freedom in all areas equally. The problem for ID advocates is 
the Establishment Clause, and particularly the Court’s analysis in 
Edwards, as well as the Court’s endorsement test, understood in light of 
that case. Edwards says that at least in the area of teaching evolution and 
its alternatives, courts must look closely to the relationship between means 
and ends in evaluating whether an articulated purpose is actually a 
sham;117 in other words, the Court has shifted the burden to evolution 
opponents to enact changes to the school curriculum in such a way that the 
Court is convinced that the real motive for change is not to promote a 
particular religious viewpoint. To put it another way, a court will likely 
find that a policy in this area at all resembling past unconstitutional 
policies will send a message of endorsement unless the advocates for 
change make special efforts to defuse that message. The fact that there’s 
cbsnews.com/stories/2004/11/22/opinion/polls/main657083.shtml (reporting that 55% of all 
Americans believe “God created humans in present form” and another 27% believe that “[h]umans 
Evolved, God guided the process”). 
 115. This would seem particularly true in light of poll results that show that almost two-thirds of 
Americans would like creationism taught alongside evolution in the public schools. Id. 
 116. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). The Court 
stated: 
Evils in the same field may be of different dimensions and proportions, requiring different 
remedies. Or so the legislature may think. Or the reform may take one step at a time, 
addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind. 
The legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the 
others. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 117. See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 586–88. 
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no particular reason to promote or protect academic freedom with respect 
to ID as opposed to other controversial topics weighs heavily in favor of 
finding a policy backed by the academic freedom rationale to be 
unconstitutional. 
3. Promoting Neutrality and Erasing Endorsement 
Finally, Beckwith contends that schools might teach ID either to “erase 
[the] perception . . . that a certain disputed, irreligious point of view is 
favored,”118 or to ensure that by balancing the teaching of evolution 
(which “presupposes a controversial epistemology . . . entails a 
controversial metaphysics . . . and is antithetical to traditional religious 
belief”)119 with ID, it will “remain neutral . . . between religion and 
irreligion.”120 These two arguments are worth treating together, because 
they both basically assert the same thing, although in slightly different 
terms.121 Both suggest that the state acts with a secular purpose when it 
enacts a policy intended to restore balance to a school curriculum that in 
some way disadvantages religious points of view. This is certainly an 
interesting argument, and it will take a bit of a detour through the current 
state of church-state law to understand why the argument ultimately fails. 
Government neutrality toward religion and non-religion of course 
sounds like a laudable goal. Why should the government intentionally take 
a position that is harmful to religious belief or practice? More specifically, 
it perhaps seems unfair and overly intrusive at first glance for a public 
school to send a message that is at odds with somebody’s sincere religious 
beliefs. On closer look, however, it becomes quite apparent that true 
substantive neutrality toward religion is impossible. The key to 
understanding this point is to recognize both the numerous ways that the 
government takes positions in public life and the countless viewpoints 
embraced by the numerous religious groups that populate the nation.  
The government takes positions in all sorts of ways in its everyday 
operations, through everything from the speeches of public officials to the 
funding of certain groups and viewpoints to the monuments it establishes 
on public property to the criminal and regulatory laws it promulgates to 
the curricula adopted by public schools. Because the country is so 
religiously diverse, these government positions inevitably conflict with at 
 118. BECKWITH, supra note 5, at 156. 
 119. Id. at 157. 
 120. Id.  
 121. Even Professor Beckwith says that the two arguments are substantially the same. See id. 
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least somebody’s religious viewpoint. For example, some122 Quakers are 
pacifists; some Christian scientists do not believe in conventional 
medicine; some Mormons believe in polygamy; groups like The Creativity 
Movement (formerly the Church of the World Creator) and the Christian 
Identity preach violence against blacks and Jews;123 some people believe 
that the Bible establishes that the Earth is flat;124 the Church of Satan 
believes in indulgence, vengeance, and engaging in sins for purposes of 
gratification;125 Raelians believe that aliens created the human race about 
25,000 years ago;126 some practitioners of Vodun (commonly referred to 
as Voodoo) believe that dead people can be revived after being buried;127 
some Wiccans believe that they can communicate with the dead through 
séances;128 some Jains believe it is wrong to kill any living thing at all, 
including bugs and vegetables,129 and may wear masks to avoid “breathing 
in tiny insects”;130 and some adherents of Falun Gong believe they can 
harness their life force to cure illnesses, see into other worlds, move 
objects by telekinesis, walk through walls, and fly.131
It is certainly not the case that the government, in the messages it 
sends, must be neutral with respect to all of these religious beliefs. For 
example, the state can take the position that racial intolerance and violence 
 122. Just to emphasize this caveat to the following list, my point here is only that there are some 
(perhaps only a few) members of each religion listed that believe in the noted practice, not that every 
member believes in the practice. The citations provided, concededly superficial in nature, are not 
meant to establish anything more than this limited (but important) point. 
 123. For information on these two groups, see, example, Religious Tolerance.org, Christian 
Identity Movement, http://www.religioustolerance.org/cr_ident.htm (last visited June 22, 2005); 
Religious Tolerance.org, The Creativity Movement, http://www.religioustolerance.org/wcotc.htm (last 
visited June 22, 2005). 
 124. See, e.g., Robert P. J. Day, Documenting the Existence of “The International Flat Earth 
Society” (1993), http://www.talkorigins.org/faqs/flatearth.html (1993). 
 125. See Anton S. La Vey, The Nine Satanic Statements, http://www.churchofsatan.com/home. 
html (last visited June 22, 2005). 
 126. See The Raelian Movement: The Messages, http://www.rael.org/rael_content/rael_summary. 
php (last visited June 22, 2005). 
 127. See Religious Tolerance.org, Vodun (and related religions), http://www.religioustolerance. 
org/voodoo.htm (last visited June 22, 2005) (“One belief unique to Vodun is that a dead person can be 
revived after having been buried.”). 
 128. See, e.g., Hannah Nichols, Paganism and the Search for Truth and Proof (2004), 
http://www.iamnext.com/spirituality/paganism.html (noting that modern Wiccans still engage in the 
practice of communicating with the dead through séances). 
 129. See Religious Tolerance.org, Jain Dharma (a.k.a. Jainism), 
 (last visited June 22, 2005).
http://www.religioustolerance. 
org/jainism.htm
 130. See Wikipedia, Jainism, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jainism (last visited June 22, 2005). 
 131. See, e.g., David Van Biema, The Man With the Qi, TIME May 10, 1999, at 74 (interview with 
Li Hongzhi); Religious Tolerance.org, Introduction to Falum Gong & Falun Dafa, http://www. 
religioustolerance.org/falungong1.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2006). Of course, whether Falun Gong 
constitutes a religion for constitutional purposes is an open question.  
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is wrong, eating vegetables is not a sin, the world is round, people ought 
not to be vengeful, war is sometimes justified, it is wrong to marry more 
than one person, conventional medicine works, and it is impossible to 
walk through walls and fly no matter how well one manages his or her life 
force. The government can punish hate crimes, run public service ads 
urging citizens to eat their vegetables (or create a food pyramid to this 
effect), employ navigation systems that assume a spherical Earth, preach 
kindness and tolerance toward others, engage in war, criminalize 
polygamy, fund conventional medicine, and teach in its schools that 
people cannot fly (and indeed give detention to students who try).132  
The Supreme Court used to recognize that the Free Exercise Clause 
placed some limits on the government’s ability to burden religious 
believers through its actions. Prior to 1990, the Court applied so-called 
strict scrutiny to government action that placed substantial burdens on 
religious belief and practice,133 although this scrutiny was often rather less 
than strict in practice.134 During this period, the remedy the Court granted 
to believers who were substantially burdened in the absence of any 
compelling government interest was an individual exemption from the 
government law or action, not an injunction against the government law or 
action itself.135 Thus, even though the Court found that Wisconsin’s 
compulsory education requirement was unconstitutional with respect to 
certain Amish parents who believed their children should not have to 
attend public school after the age of fifteen, the Court’s remedy was to 
give the plaintiffs an exemption from the education law, rather than 
striking down the law itself.136 Even this limited remedy, however, no 
longer exists under the First Amendment, since the Court decided in the 
 132. The Constitution presumably places some limit on the state’s authority to explicitly criticize 
religion generally or a particular religion, through the Supreme Court’s somewhat incoherent and 
certainly unexplored “disapproval” prong of the endorsement test. See Board of Educ. of Westside 
Cnty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 249 (1990) (“Because the Act on its face grants equal access to 
both secular and religious speech, we think it clear that the Act’s purpose was not to ‘endorse or 
disapprove of religion.’” (citations omitted)). But as Smith implies, a general law or practice that 
burdens religion somehow does not by itself constitute an unconstitutional disapproval of religion. See 
infa note 125. Perhaps an explicit statement from the state to the effect that the religion in question is 
clearly wrong to believe what it believes would be unconstitutional, but the examples provided here do 
not rise to that level. 
 133. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963). 
 134. See, e.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 441–42, 449 (1988) 
(rejecting claim of Native Americans that the Forest Service’s plan to destroy sacred forest would 
violate their Free Exercise rights); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) (rejecting Free 
Exercise claim of soldier to wear yarmulke against military regulation because of special military 
context). 
 135. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235 (1972).  
 136. See id. at 207, 234–36. 
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(in)famous Smith case that the Free Exercise Clause does not prohibit the 
government from imposing substantial burdens on religious belief and 
practice through the application of neutral laws of general applicability.137  
Thus, after Smith, a religious believer who is burdened by a neutral and 
general government action, policy, or law cannot claim a violation of his 
or her Free Exercise rights.138 Instead, the believer is restricted to pursuing 
a legislative accommodation.139 The state, if it so chooses, may grant the 
believer an exemption from the generally applicable law through 
legislation, subject to some constitutional limits articulated by the 
Supreme Court.140 These Establishment Clause limits require that the 
accommodation relieve a substantial burden imposed on the believer by 
the state; that the accommodation has a limited negative effect on 
nonbeneficiaries; and, importantly, that the accommodation be 
denominationally neutral to the extent possible.141 On this last point, then-
Professor Michael McConnell has explained that, “[a]n accommodation 
must not favor one form of religious belief over another. Since the 
objective of religious accommodations is to enhance the freedom of choice 
. . . [r]eligions pluralism demands that, where possible, the government’s 
actions must not be permitted to affect the previously existing religious 
mix.”142
What, then, does all this have to do with Beckwith’s suggestion that a 
school might insulate itself from constitutional attack by enacting an ID 
policy with the goal of promoting neutrality in the school curriculum (or 
erasing the endorsement of irreligion in that curriculum)? For one thing, it 
makes it quite clear that Beckwith is wrong to the extent his arguments 
imply that public schools are constitutionally required to teach ID in order 
 137. See Employment Div. Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). The 
Court has provided that certain laws burdening religion will continue to get strict scrutiny, including 
laws falling directly under the Sherbert line of cases, id. at 883, so-called hybrid claims involving the 
Free Exercise Clause and some other constitutional right, id. at 881 (distinguishing Yoder), and laws 
that are not truly neutral or generally applicable, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of 
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 524 (1993) (striking down local Florida ordinances for targeting the Santeria 
practice of animal sacrifice). Also, the Court has recently upheld against an Establishment Clause 
attack the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), which provides for strict 
scrutiny review of laws that burden religious practice in certain contexts, such as prisons that receive 
federal funds. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005). 
 138. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. 
 139. Id. 
 140. See, e.g., Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. 
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334–35 (1987) (rejecting Establishment Clause attack on exemption from Title 
VII’s ban on religious discrimination in hiring for religious organizations). 
 141. See, e.g., Cutter, 544 U.S. at 718–24 (discussing these three constitutional requirements). 
 142. Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 39 (1986) 
(emphasis removed). 
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to maintain neutrality.143 Beckwith is not alone in suggesting that the 
public school curriculum must be viewpoint neutral with respect to 
religion; many other thinkers and jurists have said the same thing.144 The 
argument, however, is completely unworkable, ignores the fact that there 
are many religions rather than just one, and misapprehends the nature of 
public schooling, which takes all sorts of positions on all types of 
important public issues in almost everything it does. If the argument were 
true, schools would have to teach racial hatred, flat earth theory, and flying 
in addition to ID to make sure they were not being non-neutral with 
respect to students who happen to believe in these things. Such a course is 
obviously undesirable and not required by the First Amendment. 
The more important question is whether the state of the law affects 
either the secular purpose analysis or the endorsement analysis of an ID 
policy justified by such endorsement-erasing or neutrality-promoting 
concerns. Should such a purpose be considered secular for First 
Amendment purposes? Would articulation of this purpose truly erase any 
endorsement of religion under the Establishment Clause? These are 
difficult questions, but ultimately the non-neutrality/endorsement purpose 
cannot save ID policies from constitutional infirmity. Assuming for the 
sake of argument that such a purpose would pass scrutiny as a secular 
purpose under the very strict approach embodied by the Court in 
Edwards,145 an ID policy would still likely endorse religion even if it is 
 143. I think that Beckwith’s language implies exactly this when he writes that: “[A]n ID statute 
could be justified on the basis of neutrality by arguing that to teach only one theory of origins . . . the 
state is in fact advocating, aiding, fostering, and promoting irreligion, which it is constitutionally 
forbidden from doing.” BECKWITH, supra note 5, at 157 (emphasis added). This suggests that an ID 
statute is arguably constitutionally necessary to dispel the constitutionally forbidden message that is 
currently being sent by the public schools. On the other hand, Beckwith has publicly stated that he 
does not think that public schools should, as a policy matter, at this point of time, teach ID, which 
suggests that he does not think that public schools must teach ID to maintain neutrality. See Posting of 
Francis J. Beckwith to http://pharyngula.org/comments/495_0_1_0_C/ (Mar. 20, 2004, 00:50 EST) 
(Beckwith claiming that he has “no horse in this race”). To my mind, however, this latter position is in 
some tension with what he has written regarding viewpoint neutrality and the public school 
curriculum. 
 144. See, e.g, WARREN A. NORD, RELIGION & AMERICAN EDUCATION: RETHINKING A NATIONAL 
DILEMMA 243 (1995) (“The Court has given public schools permission to teach about religion, but it 
has never claimed that religion must be taught to restore neutrality to a curriculum that is hostile to 
religion. Yet, this should be its position.”); id at 8, 131, 378 (making similar points); See also Citizens 
for a Responsible Curriculum v. Montgomery County Public Sch., Civil Action No. AW-05-1194, 
mem. op. at 20–21 (S.D. Md. May 5, 2005) available at http://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/Opinion152/ 
Opinions/CRC050505.pdf (Judge Alexander Williams, Jr. granting order enjoining a curriculum 
allegedly endorsing a pro-gay lifestyle, in part on grounds that the curriculum presents only one view 
of a controversial subject). 
 145. See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text. 
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put forward specifically as a way of balancing the curriculum between 
religion and non-religion. 
As with Beckwith’s two other possible secular purposes, this one too 
fails because of the looseness of the means-ends connection, which in fact 
strengthens the endorsement message that an ID policy would send, rather 
than erasing it. Teaching ID as a way of promoting the neutrality of the 
public school curriculum is patently underinclusive with respect to that 
goal. As explained above, the state acts non-neutrally with regard to 
religious views of all sorts, in all types of ways. If neutrality is really the 
goal, why would policy-makers focus only on one specific way in which 
the state’s messages are non-neutral? Indeed, an ID policy would not even 
address the non-neutrality issue in the limited setting of the public school 
curriculum, much less in the sphere of government activity as a whole. An 
ID policy justified on neutrality or anti-endorsement grounds would in fact 
promote the specific religious belief in monotheism as compared to the 
myriad other religious beliefs that are treated in a non-neutral fashion by 
the state. Such a policy would send the message that some instances of 
government non-neutrality are more important than others, and therefore 
some religious viewpoints are more important than others. More 
specifically, such a policy, by teaching ID but not polygamy, non-medical 
healing, or walking through walls, would favor the religious belief in 
monotheism over the beliefs held by some Mormons, Christian Scientists, 
and Falun Gong practitioners.146
To see this more clearly, consider what would happen if the school 
sought to deal with the religious opposition to evolution using the one 
specific method approved (in some circumstances) by the Supreme Court: 
a discretionary accommodation. If an ID supporter sought an 
accommodation from the school board to allow his child to sit out the unit 
on evolution and the school granted the exemption, could the school then 
deny an exemption to a Quaker who wanted her children to sit out a 
discussion of why the Iraq war is just or to a Christian Scientist who does 
not want his child to learn about the terrific achievements of modern 
medicine? Assuming that the Quaker and Christian Scientist claim that the 
lesson is offensive or troublesome in basically the same way that the 
evolution-opponent claims, the school would have no justification in 
granting the one exemption but not the other. Such a policy would run 
afoul of the requirement that accommodations be granted in a 
 146. See supra text accompanying notes 122–32. 
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denominationally-neutral fashion147 and violate the Court’s ruling in 
Larson v. Valente that “[t]he clearest command of the Establishment 
Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred 
over another.”148 If a school cannot selectively grant accommodations, 
why should it be able to sidestep this prohibition by selectively altering the 
curriculum to favor one particular religious belief on the grounds that 
doing so is necessary to maintain neutrality? 
The point here is not that the First Amendment generally bars schools 
from altering the curriculum in small ways to maintain religious neutrality. 
The point is ID-specific; in light of all of ID’s other problems, including 
its historical connection with previous unconstitutional efforts and 
complete lack of support in the scientific community,149 enacting an ID 
policy with the articulated goal of maintaining neutrality or erasing 
endorsement in the school curriculum would not save the policy from 
sending the message that the curriculum was in fact being altered to 
promote a particular religious belief.150  
III. ACADEMIC FREEDOM? 
Finally, Beckwith argues that public school teachers have some limited 
First Amendment academic freedom rights to teach ID in addition to 
teaching the prescribed biology curriculum.151 Specifically, in 
commenting on a Minnesota Court of Appeals decision called LeVake v. 
 147. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005) (observing that courts “must be satisfied 
that [a statute’s] prescriptions are and will be administered neutrally among different faiths”). 
 148. 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982). 
 149. See supra text accompanying notes 88–92. 
 150. Under the rubric of preserving neutrality, Beckwith also argues that teaching ID might be 
necessary to dispel the public school’s coercion of a non-religious viewpoint. See BECKWITH, supra 
note 5, at 158–59 (“[P]ermitting or requiring public schools to teach the alternative to naturalistic 
evolution—Intelligent Design—would be a way to ensure that the Establishment Clause is not violated 
via the no coercion test.”). Beckwith relies on the Court’s decision in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 
(1992), but that case is inapposite. Lee stands for the notion that schools cannot coerce students into 
participating in religious exercises, even by placing them in a situation in which the coercion actually 
results from peer pressure, but the case says nothing about the government’s authority to place burdens 
on religious believers, say by making them learn something that is at odds with their religious beliefs. 
Lee, 505 U.S. at 593, 598–99. Indeed, in Smith, the Court held that the government is free to impose 
such burdens, so long as it does so in a neutral and generally applicable manner. Employment Div., 
Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). If a school wishes to protect a student from 
such a burden, it may exempt him from the evolution lesson, so long as it exempts other students from 
similar burdens on their religious beliefs, but attempting to accommodate the ID believer by teaching 
ID fails for the same reason that the neutrality/endorsement argument fails—it privileges ID compared 
to other religious viewpoints that are disadvantaged by the curriculum.  
 151. See BECKWITH, supra note 5, at 73–76. 
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Independent School District,152 Beckwith contends that “bringing into the 
classroom relevant material that is supplementary to the curriculum (and 
not a violation of any other legal duties), when the public school teacher 
has adequately fulfilled all of her curricular obligations, is protected 
speech under the rubric of academic freedom.”153 In support of this 
argument, Beckwith cites dictum from Keyishian v. Board of Regents,154 
in which the Supreme Court opined that the First Amendment “does not 
tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom,”155 as well 
as select quotations from other cases like Moore v. Gaston County Board 
of Education156 and Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
District,157 which are said to stand for the proposition that teachers possess 
First Amendment academic freedom rights to supplement the proscribed 
curriculum with their own materials and views.158
Beckwith is certainly correct in his claim that the First Amendment 
places some limits on the state’s authority to fire government employees, 
including public school teachers, and that those teachers do not forfeit 
their First Amendment rights when they accept a government job. The 
Supreme Court, in a case called Pickering v. Board of Education,159 has 
held that teachers have a limited right to speak as citizens on matters of 
public concern without facing employment-based retribution from their 
government employers.160 But this right to speak out as citizens (for 
example, in newspaper editorials, meetings, and other public forums 
outside the classroom) is entirely different from the purported right to 
include material or views in the classroom against the orders of the state, 
school board, or school authorities. This latter right simply does not exist. 
 152. 625 N.W.2d 502 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). Beckwith has written an entire essay about the 
issues raised by this case. See Francis J. Beckwith, A Liberty Not Fully Evolved?: The Case of Rodney 
LeVake and the Right of Public School Teachers to Criticize Darwinism, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1311 
(2002). 
 153. BECKWITH, supra note 5, at 76. It is unclear what the phrase “other legal duties” means here. 
I assume that it does not mean a clear school policy prohibiting any discussion of ID, because only if 
such a policy existed would there be any need for a teacher to assert a First Amendment academic 
freedom right in the first place. 
 154. 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
 155. Id. at 603. 
 156. 357 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D. N.C. 1973). 
 157. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). Tinker is particularly inapposite, since it concerned the speech rights of 
the students in the school rather than the teachers. Id. at 504. 
 158. See BECKWITH, supra note 5, at 74–76. 
 159. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).  
 160. Id. at 568. This right is subject to a balancing test, in which the interest of the speaker is 
weighed against the relevant countervailing government interests. Id. The Pickering line of cases also 
includes Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), and United States v. National Treasury Employees 
Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995). 
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It finds no support in Supreme Court precedent, is contrary to existing law 
and common sense, would undermine the democratic accountability of 
public schools, and would cause havoc in the nation’s educational 
system.161
To begin with, the Court has never proclaimed any independent 
“academic freedom” right for public secondary school teachers or anyone 
else. Of course, the words “academic freedom” do not appear in the First 
Amendment or anywhere else in the Constitution, and although the phrase 
can occasionally be found in Supreme Court dicta, the Court has never 
invoked an academic freedom rationale to invalidate any government law 
or practice and has never applied it at all to protect the rights of 
individuals, as opposed to academic institutions.162 As the Fourth Circuit 
recently put it, 
[T]he Supreme Court has never set aside a state regulation on the 
basis that it infringed a First Amendment right to academic 
freedom. . . . [t]o the extent it has constitutionalized a right of 
academic freedom at all, [the Court] appears to have recognized 
only an institutional right of self-governance in academic affairs.163
Second, the Supreme Court has not adopted (and the lower courts that 
have recently considered the issue have for the most part explicitly 
rejected) the notion that government employees, including public school 
teachers, have any First Amendment right to speak in their role as 
employees contrary to the dictates of their democratically accountable 
supervisors.164 In other words, even if a teacher may have a right to speak 
 161. See infra text accompanying notes 147–55. 
 162. For a careful explanation of why the Supreme Court’s dicta regarding academic freedom 
does not constitute any sort of holding or rule that would protect teachers in the context Beckwith 
discusses, see Malcolm Stewart, The First Amendment, The Public Schools, and the Inculcation of 
Community Values, 18 J.L. & EDUC. 23, 59 (1989).  
 163. Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 412 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 164. See, e.g., Karen C. Daly, Balancing Act: Teachers’ Classroom Speech and the First 
Amendment, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 6 (2001) (“The Supreme Court has yet to squarely address what level 
of protection, if any, should be accorded to teachers’ in-class speech.”); id. at 18 (“From a practical 
standpoint, none of the recent circuit decisions applying Pickering have found in-class speech to 
qualify as a matter of public concern.”). For key cases, see Kirkland v. Northside Independent School 
District, 890 F.2d 794, 802 (5th Cir. 1989) (“We hold only that public school teachers are not free, 
under the first amendment, to arrogate control of the curricula.”); Boring v. Buncombe County Board 
of Education, 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998). In Boring, the court stated, 
In the case of a public school . . . it is far better policy . . . that the makeup of the curriculum 
be entrusted to the local school authorities who are in some sense responsible, rather than to 
the teachers, who would be responsible only to the judges, had they a First Amendment right 
to participate in the makeup of the curriculum. 
Id. at 371. But see Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1051–52 (6th Cir. 2001) 
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out as a private citizen in favor of ID (or drug use, Communism, or any 
other unpopular idea) at a public meeting or in a newspaper editorial 
without fear of losing his or her job, the same teacher does not possess the 
same right to speak out on those same topics within the classroom if the 
relevant authorities have given sufficiently clear notice that such topics or 
viewpoints are off-limits. Again, the Fourth Circuit articulated this 
position when it explained that prior to determining whether the Pickering 
balancing test even applies to a public employee, the court must determine 
whether the employee is speaking as a citizen or rather in her capacity as 
employee: 
This focus on the capacity of the speaker recognizes the basic truth 
that speech by public employees undertaken in the course of their 
job duties will frequently involve matters of vital concern to the 
public, without giving those employees a First Amendment right to 
dictate to the state how they will do their jobs.165
This analysis comports with common sense. If high-level government 
officials lack the power to restrict the official government speech of their 
employees, then those employees (including teachers) who serve as 
spokespersons for the state would have near-complete authority to 
countermand the state’s official messages. The Fourth Circuit uses the 
example of an assistant district attorney at a formal press conference who 
criticizes his boss’s decision to pursue a murder charge,166 but this is only 
one of countless possible examples in which Beckwith’s rule would 
disrupt the functioning of the government. One only has to imagine the 
President’s Press Secretary condemning the war in Iraq, an EPA scientist 
making an official statement that a particular type of pollution is far worse 
than the Administrator has recognized, or a state employment officer 
speaking out against the state’s affirmative action policies to understand 
the chaos of recognizing a First Amendment right in a subordinate 
speaking in his or her official capacity on matters of public concern.167
(rejecting approach of the Fourth and Fifth Circuits). 
 165. Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 407. 
 166. See id. at 407–08. 
 167. For an important discussion of this issue, see Robert C. Post, Between Governance and 
Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713 (1987). Post 
writes, 
When administering its own institutions, the government is invested with a special form of 
authority, which I shall call “managerial.” Managerial authority is controlled by first 
amendment rules different from those which control the exercise of the authority used by the 
state when it acts to govern the general public. 
Id. at 1775. See also id. at 1771–72 (using the example of a government subordinate who insists on 
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Recognizing this right would be just as problematic in the public 
schools as it would be elsewhere in the government. There does not seem 
to be any principled way to limit Beckwith’s rule to the ID context, and 
Beckwith does not suggest any. This means that teachers could teach their 
views on a whole array of controversial topics with the school having no 
recourse against them whatsoever. Teachers could supplement a sex 
education class with their own views about whether condoms actually 
work or how HIV is really transferred, suggest that the federally-funded 
abstinence lesson they just taught is a “bunch of bunk,” mention at the end 
of their health lesson that drugs are in fact “kind of fun,” hint that the 
evidence showing the existence of the Holocaust is a “bit overstated,” or 
argue that slavery was a mutually beneficial economic arrangement for 
whites and blacks alike.  
Ensuring that government supervisors can control the official 
statements of their subordinates serves to promote democratic 
accountability among government decision-makers for the state’s official 
messages.168 Ultimately, those who speak on the state’s behalf are 
speaking for its citizens, and those citizens ought to have some recourse if 
the state decides to take an official position that the citizens find abhorrent, 
offensive, or just plain wrong. The electoral process provides this 
accountability check, but only for those officials at the highest level. It 
would stand to reason, then, that to preserve accountability, those highest-
level officials ought to have the final say with regard to what messages the 
state will adopt. If the courts adopted Beckwith’s position, then citizens 
would be deprived of any real power to hold the government accountable 
for its statements in cases in which an employee exercises his or her First 
Amendment rights to make an official statement on a controversial issue 
that is contrary to the message that the state itself endorses. In other words, 
if a public school teacher decides to teach that the Holocaust never 
happened, the community ought to be able to pressure the school board (or 
the relevant decision-making body) to stop the teacher from promoting 
this view in the classroom. If the board can control the teacher’s speech, 
presenting his position on some matter instead of the position that the superior has insisted be 
presented); Stewart, supra note 162, at 66, 67 n.136. 
 168. See Stewart, supra note 162, at 27. Stewart explains, 
[T]he basic principle of democratic theory is that decisions made by popularly-elected 
officials have the presumptive approval of the community. . . . When a court orders school 
officials to present in school programs messages which the officials have chosen not to 
present, it is in fact denying the majority of parents the right to educate their children as they 
see fit. 
Id. 
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and the board agrees with the community, then the teacher will either stop 
speaking or be fired. If the board does not want to reprimand the teacher, 
then the community can vote the relevant board members off of the board. 
On the other hand, if the teacher has a First Amendment right to say what 
he or she wants, the community will have no legal or political recourse to 
stop the teacher from continuing to engage in the detested speech.169
Of course, Beckwith does not argue that a teacher has a First 
Amendment right to replace the prescribed curriculum by teaching ID 
theory instead of evolution; rather he argues that a teacher has the right to 
supplement the existing evolution curriculum with ID theory.170 But this 
distinction does not save the argument, because there is no reason to think 
that the analysis is any different just because the employee first says what 
he is supposed to say before putting in his own two cents. A First 
Amendment rule allowing supplementation but not replacement would 
still undermine the functioning of government and interrupt the lines of 
democratic accountability. Should the President’s Press Secretary really be 
able to say at a press conference that “the President believes that the war in 
Iraq is just, but it’s not”? Should a public school teacher be able to say, 
“Most people believe that the Holocaust happened, but they are wrong,” or 
“the school thinks you shouldn’t have sex, but I think you should,” if the 
community strongly disagrees with these positions?  
Finally, it is worth noting that nothing I have said here is meant to 
suggest that schools and school boards should regularly choose to restrict 
what their teachers may say or do in the classroom. There are certainly 
strong educational arguments in favor of allowing teachers wide latitude to 
teach the material they wish in the manner they wish, even if sometimes 
their teaching methods or materials are controversial. Providing teachers 
such leeway also sends the important message both to the community and 
to the teachers themselves that teachers are respected professionals whose 
work is incredibly important and central to the effective functioning of a 
democracy. Indeed, I would think that in the vast majority of cases, school 
 169. The school or school board could presumably fire the board for appointing the teacher, but 
this would not stop the speech, and such a practice would encourage government employers to hire 
only the most non-controversial employees, when in fact, sometimes interesting and controversial 
speech can be good, so long as the employer can ultimately control it if it goes too far. 
 170. See BECKWITH, supra note 5, at 76. It is not clear, however, why Beckwith adopts this 
position as a matter of First Amendment free speech theory, since the First Amendment protects 
private parties from government compelled speech as well as prohibited speech. See, e.g., Wooley v. 
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (holding that individuals have a First Amendment right to cover 
up state messages on license plates); W.V. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) 
(finding students have a First Amendment right not to say the Pledge of Allegiance). 
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boards should allow teachers vast freedom to do what they want when 
they are in front of their classes. But this argument is based on sound 
educational policy, not constitutional law. Saying that schools ought to 
allow teachers to supplement the curriculum with their own views in most 
cases is not the same thing as saying that teachers should have a First 
Amendment right to supplement the curriculum with their own 
controversial viewpoints in those few cases in which the community is 
strongly opposed to that viewpoint. The latter purported “right” has no 
basis in constitutional text or precedent and is contrary to common sense 
and the ideals of the political community. 
CONCLUSION 
It is possible that the recent decision striking down Dover, 
Pennsylvania’s ID policy has sounded the death knell for the ID 
movement. More likely, however, courts will continue to be called upon 
from time to time to consider the constitutionality of teaching ID in the 
public schools. When they do, they should realize that although ID may in 
some ways be different from the anti-evolution iterations that have come 
before it, in many ways it is quite the same. It is best viewed as a religious 
belief, and teaching it in the public schools as a scientific theory when it 
has achieved no success within the scientific community will likely be 
understood by a reasonable believer as an endorsement of religious belief. 
Professor Beckwith has advanced some creative arguments in ID’s favor 
and critiqued some of my own along the way, but these ultimately 
unsuccessful contentions should not distract the courts from continuing to 
recognize ID’s inherent constitutional infirmities. 
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